

1 Wednesday, 26 June, 1946

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3  
4 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL  
5 FOR THE FAR EAST  
6 Court House of the Tribunal  
7 War Ministry Building  
8 Tokyo, Japan

9 The Tribunal met, pursuant to adjournment,  
10 at 0930.

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12 Appearances:

13 For the Tribunal, same as before.

14 For the Prosecution Section, same as before.

15 For the Defense Section, same as before.

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17  
18 (English to Japanese and Japanese  
19 to English interpretation was made by OKA,  
20 Takashi and IWAMOTO, Masahito, Sho Onodera  
21 acting as Monitor.)  
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1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International  
2 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now in session.

3 THE PRESIDENT: All the accused are present  
4 except MATSUOKA and OKAWA, who appear by counsel.

5 Does any counsel desire to mention any  
6 matter?

7  
8 K I J U R O S H I D E H A R A, called as a witness  
9 on behalf of the prosecution, resumed the stand  
10 and testified as follows:

11 CROSS-EXAMINATION (Continued):

12 BY MR. FURNESS:

13 Q Baron SHIDEHARA, in your testimony yesterday  
14 you stated that after the Manchurian Incident broke  
15 out T. V. SOONG and SHIGEMITSU conferred together as  
16 to how the Incident could be settled, and that as  
17 you recalled, the plan, or the suggestion was to  
18 appoint representatives of both parties, China and  
19 Japan, and have these representatives confer with  
20 respect to seeking out such amicable settlement, and  
21 that you received a report of this. Now, do you  
22 recall any further details on these tentative plans?  
23 If so, tell us what they were.

24 A What you have said just now is just about  
25 all of what I remember myself.

SHIDEHARA

CROSS

1 Q Is it correct to say that according to your  
2 recollection, the objective of these talks, tentative  
3 plans, Japan was by direct negotiation between China  
4 and Japan to localize the Incident to end the hos-  
5 tilities resulting from it, and to prevent similar  
6 Incidents occurring in the future?

7 A It is just as you say.

8 Q Do you recall what, in your opinion, pre-  
9 vented the success of these efforts?

10 A I believe that there was a disagreement  
11 within the Chinese Government itself concerning this  
12 point. As far as Japan was concerned there was no  
13 difficulty.

14 Q You are convinced that Mr. SHIGEMITSU did his  
15 best to accomplish those results?

16 A I am convinced that Minister SHIGEMITSU, with  
17 whole hearted sincerity, did all he could to bring  
18 about the success of these negotiations.

19 Q Can you tell us --

20 MR. HELM: I object to this line of ques-  
21 tioning as drawing the conclusions and opinions from  
22 the witness. We do not object to any concrete  
23 facts that the defense might bring out from this  
24 witness that might even exonerate the defendants,  
25 but to bring out conclusions and opinions we do

1 object.

2 THE PRESIDENT: How otherwise could the  
3 witness state the accused SHIGEMITSU's attitude?  
4 It is a relevant fact.

5 MR. HELM: I very respectfully suggest, your  
6 Honor, by just stating what the defendant SHIGEMITSU  
7 did, and not what the present witness believes about  
8 it.

9 MR. FURNESS: I submit, your Honor, that  
10 due to the intimate association --

11 THE PRESIDENT: Let the translation go, please.  
12 The objection is overruled. You may proceed, Mr.  
13 Furness.

14 MR. FURNESS: Is there a question which has  
15 not been answered?

16 (No response)

17 Q Were the cabinet and foreign office officials  
18 advised in advance of the movement of Japanese troops  
19 in Manchuria and into Manchuria after this **Incident**?

20 A Yes. Concerning the movements of the army  
21 in Manchuria, I received reports from Japanese coun-  
22 suls stationed in Manchuria from time to time.

23 Q Was not that after the troops had moved  
24 rather than prior to their movement?

25 A No. I had received reports concerning



SHIDEHARA

CROSS

1 these movements beforehand also?

2 Q But the cabinet and the Foreign Office  
3 officials had no control over such movements, is  
4 that correct?

5 A Yes. As I stated yesterday, the only way  
6 in which the cabinet could call the attention of  
7 army leaders was through the War Minister.

8 Q The cabinet had therefore no control, and  
9 that is true also of the Foreign Office officials?

10 A Yes.

11 MR. FURNESS: No further questions.

12 MR. McCORMACK: If the Court please, one  
13 final question for the defense.

14 CROSS-EXAMINATION (Continued)

15 BY MR. McCORMACK:

16 Q Baron, tell the Tribunal whether or not  
17 the WAKATSUKE Cabinet was forced to resign by reason  
18 of any action by General MINAMI.

19 A The WAKATSUKE Cabinet -- it is not true that  
20 the WAKATSUKE Cabinet was forced to resign through  
21 the action of General MINAMI.

22 MR. McCORMACK: I believe that will be all  
23 for the defense. It seems as though we have probably  
24 one final question.

25 THE PRESIDENT: Captain Kleiman.

SHIDEHARA

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## CROSS-EXAMINATION (Continued)

BY CAPTAIN KLEIMAN:

Q Baron, when you told us yesterday that the cabinet had no control over action in Manchuria, did you also mean thereby that the Privy Council of the Japanese Government had no control over such action?

A The Privy Council had even less power than the cabinet to control the army. The cabinet at least was able to call the attention of the army to this movement, through the War Minister, but the Privy Council had no such means.

Q Sir, how long have you functioned in a governmental capacity.

A There are a few points which are not correct in what I said yesterday, so I would like to take this opportunity of correcting myself.

Q I withdraw that question, may it please your Honor. I don't believe I have made myself clear to the witness. May I reframe my question, sir? Baron, how long have you been in public life?

A Do you mean by "public life" the time I was in the service of the government?

Q Yes, Baron.

THE PRESIDENT: Call him "witness" and call the accused "the accused SHIGEMITSU." That is the

SHIDEHARA

CROSS

1 right thing.

2 CAPTAIN KLEIMAN: All right, your Honor. I am  
3 sorry.

4 A I was a member of the cabinet as Foreign  
5 Minister for about six years.

6 Q Are you acquainted with the policies of the  
7 various governments since the year 1931?

8 MR. HELM: I object to this question, your  
9 Honor, as going far beyond the scope.

10 CAPTAIN KLEIMAN: Reframe. From the year  
11 1931 until the year 1941.

12 THE PRESIDENT: Objection overruled.

13 A It was, I believe, on the 13th of December,  
14 1931, that I resigned as Foreign Minister. Since  
15 then I have received no information, official or  
16 otherwise, on the government and its policy.

17 Q I will read you a statement, Baron, and ask  
18 you whether this statement is factually correct.

19 THE PRESIDENT: Do paraphrase if you can.

20 CAPTAIN KLEIMAN: I will, your Honor.

21 Q (Continuing) Concerning aggression in  
22 Manchuria: "The Japanese Government which came  
23 into power on December 13, 1931, and all subsequent  
24 Japanese Governments adopted, supported and con-  
25 tinued this aggression and its gradual extension

SHIDEHARA

CROSS

1 over other parts of China." Is this statement  
2 factually correct?

3 MR. HELM: If your Honor please, I would  
4 like to object at this time. He is asking the wit-  
5 ness to swear to the issue. He read to him from the  
6 indictment. I don't think this is proper at this  
7 time, I submit very respectfully, sir.

8 THE PRESIDENT: I do not see why it should  
9 not be admitted.

10 CAPTAIN KLEIMAN: Will you please repeat the  
11 question that I asked to the witness? Baron, do you  
12 understand the question?

13 A Yes, I understood your question. Concerning  
14 the cabinets which came into power after my resigna-  
15 tion, I was able to obtain information only through  
16 newspapers, just as any other person, and I had no  
17 special means of obtaining information.

18 CAPTAIN: No further questions.

19 MR. NARITOMI: Mr. President.

20 THE PRESIDENT: Come down to the stand.

21 (Whereupon, SHIMADA, Masakazu,  
22 replaced OKA, Takashi, as interpreter.)

23 MR. NARITOMI: I am the counsel for the  
24 accused SHIRATORI, jointly with Mr. Caudle. Yesterday,  
25 on conferring with Mr. Caudle, we agreed to question

SHIDEHARA

CROSS

1 the witness concerning two facts, but Mr. Caudle  
2 only questioned him on one of these facts.

3 MR. JUSTICE MANSFIELD: If the Tribunal  
4 please, this is examination by second counsel on be-  
5 half of the accused.

6 THE PRESIDENT: We may permit it, but we  
7 may refuse it also.

8 MR. JUSTICE MANSFIELD: I respectfully ask  
9 the Tribunal to refuse to allow more than one counsel  
10 on behalf of any one accused.

11 THE PRESIDENT: Well, the other counsel  
12 was very brief, Mr. Justice Mansfield. He had not  
13 much to ask. I thought we might be a bit lenient  
14 here and allow this man to put one or two questions.

15 MR. JUSTICE MANSFIELD: They are making the  
16 witness their own witness, and yesterday they only  
17 desired to ask three questions, which they asked, and  
18 now they apparently are coming along, after a further  
19 cross-examination of other counsel, to ask further  
20 questions. It is a reexamination by counsel for  
21 the defense after there has been an interposition of  
22 other cross-examination. And I submit that each  
23 accused is only entitled to have one counsel examine,  
24 and if more than one is allowed that the other one  
25 can only examine immediately after the first counsel.



1 THE PRESIDENT: (Addressing Mr. NARITOMI)  
2 The majority of the Court is against allowing any  
3 cross-examination by you, so go back to your place,  
4 please.

5 Yes, Mr. Helm.  
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1 MR. HELM: Mr. President, I have a few  
2 questions I would like to ask on redirect.

## REDIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. HELM:

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Q First of all, Baron, I believe you said  
that you had some corrections you would like to make  
to your testimony yesterday. Please feel free to do  
so now.

A First, I wish to make correction concerning  
the dates on which various cabinets were formed.  
Second, I wish to make a correction on which cabinet  
General UGAKI was and in which cabinet General MINAMI  
was.

First, the KATO, Takaahira Cabinet. This  
cabinet was formed on June 11, 1924, and continued  
to January 30, 1926. I was Foreign Minister of this  
cabinet. The Home Minister was Baron WAKATSUKI.  
The War Minister was General UGAKI. The Navy Minis-  
ter was Admiral TAKARABE. The Finance Minister was  
Mr. HAMAGUCHI. I shall not mention the other minis-  
ters.

Next, the First WAKATSUKI Cabinet. This  
cabinet continued from the 30th of January, 1926, to  
the 20th of April, 1927. In this cabinet, also, I  
was Foreign Minister. I shall not repeat the names

SHIDEHARA

REDIRECT

1 of the Home Minister, the War Minister, the Navy  
2 Minister, and the Finance Minister, as that will  
3 complicate matters.

4 Next, the Hamaguchi Cabinet. This cabinet  
5 was formed on July 2, 1929, and continued until  
6 April 14, 1931. I was Foreign Minister also in this  
7 cabinet. The Home Minister was Mr. ADACHI. The War  
8 Minister was General UGAKI. But for a time, owing  
9 to General UGAKI's illness, General ABE Nobuyuki  
10 filled the post temporarily. The Navy Minister was  
11 Admiral TAKARABE. But later he went to the London  
12 Naval Conference. During his absence, Premier HAMA-  
13 GUCHI temporarily executed the duties of that post.  
14 The Finance Minister was INOUE Junnosuke.

15 Next, the Second Wakatsuki Cabinet. This  
16 cabinet was formed on April 14, 1931, and continued  
17 until December 31, of the first year -- of the same  
18 year. I was Foreign Minister of this cabinet. The  
19 Home Minister was Mr. ADACHI. The War Minister was  
20 General MINAMI. The Navy Minister was Admiral ABO.  
21 The Finance Minister was Mr. INOUE Junnosuke.

22 These are the correct dates as I recalled  
23 them later, and if they are inconsistent with what  
24 I said yesterday, yesterday's testimony was a mis-  
25 take, and I wish to have it corrected here.

SHIDEHARA

REDIRECT

1 Q When you received the information that the  
2 Kwantung Army was amassing troops and materiel for  
3 some contemplated military movement in Manchuria,  
4 what if anything did you do?

5 A On the whole, as I said yesterday, I re-  
6 ceived no official reports on this matter. But  
7 Japanese residents in Manchuria who came to Tokyo  
8 talked to me of this. Although it was not an  
9 official report, as the matter was one of great impor-  
10 tance I met General MINAMI, the then War Minister, and  
11 I talked to him about it and urged him strongly that  
12 some step must be taken.

13 Q What if anything did General MINAMI say?

14 MR. McCORMACK: Now, if the Court please,  
15 there comes a time when one must object. That ques-  
16 tion was directly put to this witness yesterday by  
17 myself. Now, unless the witness recalls having made  
18 a mistake yesterday on cross-examination, I do not  
19 think counsel should go over the questions that the  
20 defense attorneys put to him yesterday. In other  
21 words, counsel cannot now ask the same question and  
22 intimate to the witness that he probably made a mis-  
23 take yesterday or gave some other answers.

24 THE PRESIDENT: The question is allowed,  
25 subject to recross-examination.

SHIDEHARA

REDIRECT

1           MR. McCORMACK: May I bring to the Court's  
2 attention the fact that under our present procedure  
3 we do not get a transcript of yesterday's hearing  
4 until probably tomorrow or the next day. So I can-  
5 not have his exact testimony before me to check it  
6 against counsel. I think it takes advantage of us  
7 slightly. We should be able to have that, or the  
8 stenographer should be here with the notes from  
9 yesterday.

10           THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Mr. Helm, you may ask  
11 it. Of course, if this re-examination discloses  
12 mistakes there can be further examination, because  
13 fresh matter is necessarily introduced when a mis-  
14 take is made.

15           Q   My question was, what if anything did  
16 General MINAMI say?

17           A   I believe I replied to that question yester-  
18 day. General MINAMI, far from offering any opposi-  
19 tion to what I said, was in complete agreement with  
20 my views.

21           Q   What happened then?

22           A   Do you mean by your question, you want to  
23 know how the Manchurian Incident developed after that?  
24 The fact of the matter is that the cabinet was not  
25 able to control the army.



SHIDEHARA

REDIRECT

1 Q Did the Manchurian Incident occur after  
2 this conversation you had with General MINAMI?

3 A Yes.

4 Q Who in the cabinet is responsible for the  
5 actions and conduct of the army?

6 MR. WARREN: If the Tribunal please--

7 THE PRESIDENT: Come down to the lectern,  
8 Colonel.

9 MR. WARREN: Yes. May we respectfully  
10 suggest, sir, that we realize the prosecution has a  
11 right to go into redirect examination. But may we  
12 further suggest that he is cross-examining his own  
13 witness, which according to the practice we are  
14 acquainted with is highly irregular.

15 May we get a ruling from the Court on that  
16 so that we will not trouble the Court about it any  
17 further.

18 THE PRESIDENT: He has an absolute right to  
19 re-examine on matters brought out in cross-examina-  
20 tion. And by permission of the Tribunal he may  
21 re-examine on fresh material. That is the full  
22 extent of the rule, as I understand it.

23 You have the Tribunal's permission to pro-  
24 ceed, Major Helm. As I said before, when fresh matter  
25 is introduced in re-examination and it is introduced

SHIDEHARA

REDIRECT

1 necessarily when a mistake is corrected in re-exam-  
2 ination, the defense has a right to cross-examine,  
3 and they should not look for anything more.

4 Objection is overruled.

5 Q My question was, who in the cabinet is  
6 responsible for the actions and conduct of the army?

7 MR. LOGAN: If the Court please, that calls  
8 for a conclusion, which I think it is within the  
9 province of this Tribunal to determine, not this  
10 witness.

11 THE PRESIDENT: The objection is overruled.

12 A I believe the purport of your question is  
13 to ask who is responsible for the Manchurian Incident.  
14 But on the day the Manchurian Incident occurred,  
15 the cabinet met in council--

16 MR. HELM: If your Honor please, that was  
17 not my question at all. The witness is under some  
18 misapprehension.

19 THE PRESIDENT: Read the question to him  
20 again.

21 Q I want the simple fact of who in the cabinet  
22 at any time, not just this time, is responsible for  
23 the actions and conduct of the army.

24 A Legally, there is no rule definitely stating  
25 who is responsible for this. Therefore, I must give

SHIDEHARA

REDIRECT

1 my own personal opinion. It is my opinion that the  
2 War Minister is responsible, because he is the only  
3 one that could be responsible.

4 Q Thank you. From whom did the cabinet  
5 receive its information on the activities of the  
6 army?

7 A From the War Minister.

8 Q Did the cabinet receive information from  
9 General MINAMI in connection with the Manchurian  
10 Incident at the time of the outbreak?

11 A As I said before, on September 18, when the  
12 cabinet met, the War Minister did not know of this  
13 incident, and it was two days later, on September 20,  
14 that the War Minister submitted a written report to  
15 the cabinet on this matter.

16 THE MONITOR: Correction: When the cabinet  
17 met on September 19, General MINAMI stated that he  
18 would investigate the matter and make a report. The  
19 Manchurian Incident took place on the night of  
20 September 18.

21 Q Did the cabinet adopt any policy in con-  
22 nection with the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident?

23 A The first concern of the cabinet was to  
24 prevent the occurrence of similar incidents; that is,  
25 to prevent the further expansion of this incident.

SHIDEHARA

REDIRECT

1 And in line with this policy, the cabinet submitted  
2 a statement to the League of Nations.

3 Q Who was present at the cabinet meeting when  
4 this policy was adopted?

5 A All the members of the cabinet.

6 Q What instructions if any were issued by  
7 the cabinet in pursuance to the cabinet policy to  
8 General MINAMI, the War Minister?

9 A As I said before, the policy of the cabinet  
10 was to prevent the expansion of the incident, and  
11 to this policy General MINAMI agreed. And I believe  
12 that he gave the proper orders in accordance with  
13 this line of policy.

14 Q These instructions were issued to General  
15 MINAMI?

16 A The cabinet has no authority to give orders  
17 to the War Minister.

18 Q Well, following the War Minister's agreement  
19 with the cabinet on this policy, did the Manchurian  
20 Affair cease?

21 A As everyone knows, the Manchurian Incident  
22 did not cease. And in spite of all the efforts of  
23 General MINAMI, the Incident continued to develop  
24 and expand.

25 Q Who commanded the Kwantung Army at this

SHIDEHARA

REDIRECT

1 time?

2 A Concerning who was the Commander-in-Chief  
3 of the Kwantung Army, the cabinet had no connection  
4 with such matters. These matters belonged to the  
5 Imperial prerogative of the supreme command, and it  
6 was not within my sphere to know of such matters.

7 Q Do you know who commanded the Kwantung Army  
8 at this time?

9 A Yes. I knew through the newspapers only.

10 Q Well, who was it?

11 A Through the newspapers I heard that it was  
12 General HONJYO. But I do not know whether he was  
13 actually commanding the army or not.

14 Q I believe you said you were connected with  
15 the government at this time, did you not?

16 A Yes.

17 THE PRESIDENT: If you shorten your re-  
18 examination, it will help to shorten the recross-  
19 examination.

20 MR. HELM: I will do my best, your Honor.  
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B 1 Q Was General HONJYO recalled as a result  
a 2 of the spread of the Manchurian Incident?

o 3 A As far as I can remember, General HONJYO  
n 4 was not recalled during the time of our Cabinet.

& 5 Q Were any of the officers under General  
G 6 HONJYO disciplined at that time?

r 7 MR. BROOKS: If the Court please, I  
e 8 would like to object to that question. I would  
n 9 like to be shown disciplined for what. The an-  
b 10 swer to that question could be misinterpreted.  
e 11 It is a double-barrelled question.

g 12 MR. HELM: I will be glad to amend the  
13 question, your Honor.

14 THE PRESIDENT: This will develop into  
15 very disorderly proceedings if there is a proces-  
16 sion of counsel for the defense from their places  
17 to make objections. I shall take steps to prevent  
18 that. Proceed, Mr. Helm.

19 MR. McMANUS: Will your Honor hear me  
20 for just a moment?

21 THE PRESIDENT: I want Mr. Helm to com-  
22 plete what he was saying. To say the least, it  
23 is rudeness to interrupt a man in the middle of  
24 a sentence.

25 MR. HELM: I would like to reframe the

SHIDEHARA

REDIRECT

1 question to read thusly:

2 Q Were any of the officers under General  
3 HONJYO disciplined in any way for the spread of  
4 the Manchurian Incident?

5 A The Cabinet was not in a position to  
6 discipline either the army in Manchuria or any  
7 army anywhere. That was not within the scope  
8 of the Cabinet. Therefore, if you wish to as-  
9 certain the facts regarding that, I am not the  
10 person to ask.

11 Q Well, do you know that fact?

12 A I have never heard that any of them  
13 were disciplined in court.

14 Q Were any troops recalled from Manchuria  
15 at this time?

16 A No, I have never heard of that.

17 Q In order to suppress the spread of the  
18 Manchurian Incident, were any steps taken by the  
19 Cabinet to cut off the supplies and materiels  
20 for the Kwantung Army in Manchuria?

21 A During the tenure of the Cabinet I was  
22 in it was not necessary to stop the flow of ma-  
23 teriels to that army. They were able to do  
24 whatever they wanted to with the materiels they  
25 already had on hand.

1 Q Would you answer my question?

2 A Is that not an answer?

3 Q I will read the question again: In order  
4 to suppress the spread of the Manchurian Incident,  
5 were any steps taken by the Cabinet or anyone  
6 else to cut off the supplies and materials for  
7 the Kwantung Army in Manchuria?

8 A I do not remember that the Cabinet took  
9 any such steps.

10 Q Was the Kwantung Army reinforced?

11 MR. McCORMACK: If the Court please,  
12 I object to the form of the question, when he  
13 asks if the army was reinforced. I would sug-  
14 gest that counsel put the time so we will know  
15 the time he is talking about.

16 THE PRESIDENT: I direct the witness  
17 to answer the question as it stands.

18 A I know that the army in Korea, with-  
19 out the knowledge of the Cabinet, reinforced  
20 to a certain extent the army in Manchuria.

21 Q Did the troops move from Korea into  
22 Manchuria with or without the Imperial sanction?

23 A I understand -- it is my understanding  
24 that they entered Manchuria without the Imperial  
25 sanction.

SHIDEHARA

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1 Q At this time, Baron, who was Minister  
2 to China?

3 A Mr. SHIGEMITSU was Minister to China.

4 Q Now, prior to the outbreak of the Man-  
5 churian Incident, did Mr. SHIGEMITSU advise you  
6 of any contemplated military action on the part  
7 of the Kwantung Army in Manchuria?

8 A I do not remember that I received any  
9 such report.

10 Q Following the outbreak of the Manchurian  
11 Incident was this problem settled with the Chinese  
12 government?

13 A No, this matter was not settled. As  
14 I said yesterday, Mr. SHIGEMITSU and Mr. T. V.  
15 SOONG met together in order to find some way of  
16 solving the matter peaceably, but it seemed that  
17 there was disagreement within the Chinese govern-  
18 ment, and the matter was dropped.

19 Q Well, during these proceedings, was the  
20 Kwantung Army withdrawn from China -- from Man-  
21 churia?

22 A No, it was not withdrawn.

23 Q Was the problem ever settled with the  
24 Chinese government?

25 A No, never.

SHIDEHARA

REDIRECT

1 Q How far did the Kwantung Army spread  
2 into Manchuria?

3 A I do not remember every place and every  
4 date, but I recall that what was originally an in-  
5 cident occurring along the railway line extended  
6 all the way up to Kirin, and later, after the  
7 resignation of the NAKATSUKI Cabinet, to Chinchow.  
8 But this was after the resignation of the NAKATSUKI  
9 Cabinet.

10 MR. HELM: That is all the prosecution  
11 has for this witness, your Honor.

12 THE PRESIDENT: We will not hear any cross-  
13 examination before the recess this morning. We  
14 will recess now for fifteen minutes.

15 (Whereupon, at 1043, a recess  
16 was taken until 1100, after which the  
17 proceedings were resumed as follows:  
18 Japanese to English and English to  
19 Japanese interpretation being made by  
20 OKA, Takashi and SHIMADA, Masakazu,  
21 Lanny MIYAMOTO acting as Monitor.)  
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1 THE MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The Tribunal is  
2 now resumed.

3 THE PRESIDENT: Well, we just heard a re-  
4 examination which probably is as long as all the  
5 cross-examinations put together, and I am satis-  
6 fied that we must allow some further cross-examina-  
7 tion; but, on the other hand, some limitation must be  
8 put on them. We will allow those accused who are  
9 affected by the new matter to examine.

10 MINAMI may be heard. I think Dr. KIYOSE  
11 represents him.

12 DR. KIYOSE: I have just one very simple  
13 question to put.

14 THE PRESIDENT: You understand, Dr. KIYOSE,  
15 that your further cross-examination must be limited  
16 to the new matter brought out by the re-examination.

17 DR. KIYOSE: Yes, I understand.

18 RE CROSS-EXAMINATION

19 BY DR. KIYOSE:

20 Q The gist -- the hub of the redirect examina-  
21 tion was the question of who was responsible for the  
22 actions of the army. Therefore, my question is:  
23 The one who is responsible for the actions of the army  
24 is neither the Cabinet nor the War Minister, but the  
25 Army Chief of Staff, is that not so?

SHIDEHARA

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1           A   According to my own understanding, the  
2   major programs have to be decided by both, by  
3   the Chief of Staff and the War Minister, after the  
4   two have conferred with each other.

5           Q   Do you not rather consider that it is not  
6   a question of great problems or small problems, but  
7   that all questions of operation and strategy --  
8   that is, all questions not included in questions of  
9   the budget or of personnel -- but purely of opera-  
10   tion and strategy; were not these matters under the  
11   purview of the Chief of Staff?

12          A   As to the operational matters, the Chief  
13   of Staff -- operational and strategic matters --  
14   the Chief of Staff was to obtain the sanction from  
15   the Emperor, but prior to that it was customary that  
16   he confer with the War Minister, and that's my under-  
17   standing of the matter.

18          Q   Do you not admit that this question of  
19   previous consultation was an unofficial matter, and  
20   that as far as the official responsibility was con-  
21   cerned the Chief of Staff was solely responsible?

22          A   It is impossible for me to state which is  
23   responsible solely for that matter, but as to  
24   whether, that is, whether the War Minister is re-  
25   sponsible or the Chief of Staff is responsible for

SHIDEHARA

RE CROSS

1 that matter, because it is a matter of legal in-  
2 terpretation.

3 Q Are you aware, that in our Constitution  
4 and also in practical politics the independence  
5 of matters belonging to the high command is estab-  
6 lished?

7 A I have heard of the existence of such dis-  
8 cussions -- of the fact that the matter was dis-  
9 cussed. However, I am doubtful whether it is consti-  
10 tutionally correct or not.

11 DR. KIYOSE: Thank you.

12 THE PRESIDENT: We have decided, after  
13 some consideration, that we have heard sufficient  
14 further cross-examination, and that we would not  
15 be helped by any further cross-examination.

16 Yes, Mr. Helm.

17 MR. HELM: That is all the prosecution has  
18 for this witness, your honor.

19 THE PRESIDENT: The witness may go.

20 (Whereupon, the witness was  
21 excused.)

22 MR. HELM: May it please the Court, at  
23 this time I would like to examine SHIMIZU,  
24 Konosuke.

25 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The witness is in

SHIMIZU

DIRECT

1 court and will now be sworn.

2 - - -

3 K O N O S U K E S H I M I Z U, called as a wit-  
4 ness on behalf of the prosecution, being first  
5 duly sworn, testified as follows:

6 DIRECT EXAMINATION

7 BY MR. HELM:

8 Q What is your name?

9 A SHIMIZU, Konosuke.

10 Q Have you heretofore made an affidavit to  
11 be used in this case?

12 A Yes, I did.

13 Q Is this it.

14 A Yes, it is.

15 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: May we have the  
16 document numbered, please?

17 MR. HELM: Document No. 11517.

18 Q Was this affidavit read to you in Japanese?

19 A No, I have not heard it.

20 Q I hand you a translation of this affidavit  
21 into Japanese, and ask you if this is what was read  
22 to you as a translation of the affidavit you signed?

23 THE PRESIDENT: This is admitted. I did  
24 not say that before.

25 Q Is that your signature on the English copy?

1 A Yes.

2 (Whereupon, the document above  
3 referred to was marked prosecution's ex-  
4 hibit No. 157 for identification.)

5 Q Are those facts true?

6 A Yes, they are true.

7 MR. HELM: I offer this in evidence and  
8 ask that it be appropriately marked prosecution's  
9 next in order.

10 CLERK OF THE COURT: Exhibit No. 157.

11 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted.

12 (Whereupon, prosecution's exhibit  
13 no. 157 was received in evidence.)

14 MR. BROOKS: If the Court please, in be-  
15 half of Dr. OKAWA and General KOISO, who are men-  
16 tioned in this affidavit, I request that there be  
17 noted in the record, for the purposes of review,  
18 the following objections to the admission, and under  
19 these circumstances where the witness is present in  
20 court, of not only this affidavit but of previous  
21 and future affidavits; because the deponent is al-  
22 lowed to give evidence in response to leading ques-  
23 tions and because hearsay evidence, opinions and  
24 conclusions are being introduced in evidence in this  
25 manner; because the Japanese deponent swears on



SHIMIZU.

DIRECT

1 hearsay, and his informant, the translator at the  
2 time, is not himself sworn, and he has indicated  
3 today his willingness before even seeing the docu-  
4 ment -- what it is -- to testify that that was  
5 something he signed; because the affidavit is not  
6 in the Japanese with which the deponent is con-  
7 versant, but is in the language and style of the  
8 prosecution, who has edited same, so that certain  
9 inferences are made that would escape one not  
10 conversant with English, or legal interpretations  
11 made or emphasis placed thereon.

12 THE PRESIDENT: All eleven Members of the  
13 Tribunal have determined to put a stop to this  
14 prolixity in stating objections. Your objection  
15 has been sufficiently noted for all purposes. We  
16 will not hear you further.

17 MR. BROOKS: If the Court please --

18 THE PRESIDENT: I said we will not hear  
19 you further.

20 Who is to take charge, you or the Tribunal?  
21 Go to the rostrum, Mr. Helm.

22 MR. BROOKS: I would like an objection  
23 made to the Court's ruling again; that my defense --

24 THE PRESIDENT: We refuse to hear you  
25 further. You will be out of order, and we will take

SHIMIZU

DIRECT

1 steps to deal with you if you do not obey the  
2 Tribunal's decisions.

3 MR. HELM: Mr. President. (Reading)

4 "I, SHIMIZU, Konosuke, do swear on my  
5 conscience that the following is true:

6 "I became acquainted with KITA, Ikki  
7 about 1919 in Shanghai where I was living at that  
8 time. I returned to Tokyo on the same boat with  
9 the aforesaid KITA and on" --

10 Mr. Witness, will you listen to the  
11 Japanese version on the headphones.

12 "I returned to Tokyo on the same boat with  
13 the aforesaid KITA and on arrival in Tokyo the  
14 aforesaid KITA introduced me to Dr. OKAWA, Shumei  
15 with whom he joined efforts in promoting a series of  
16 ultra-nationalistic societies. I was connected  
17 with all of those in rather unimportant capacities,  
18 being very young at the time.

19 "For some time preceding March, 1931 the  
20 aforesaid Dr. OKAWA and I were in the habit of  
21 visiting the Kinryutei Inn where the aforesaid  
22 Dr. OKAWA met many Army officers from time to time,  
23 among whom was Colonel HASHIMOTO, Kingoro of the  
24 Army General Staff. During this time the aforesaid  
25 Dr. OKAWA told me that he, together with certain

SHIMIZU

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1 officers in the Army, including the aforesaid  
2 Colonel HASHIMOTO, Kingoro, were planning a revolu-  
3 tion for the purpose of renovating the Japanese  
4 government. I contributed approximately 2,000 yen  
5 to the aforesaid Dr. OKAWA for this purpose. My part  
6 in the plot was to throw some bombs outside the Diet  
7 Building during a demonstration of the aforesaid  
8 Dr. OKAWA's followers. It was further planned that  
9 the aforesaid Dr. OKAWA was to lead this mob into the  
10 Diet and proceed to take over the government. The  
11 aforesaid Dr. OKAWA told me that the aforesaid  
12 Colonel HASHIMOTO would obtain the bombs from the  
13 Army and cause the same to be brought to my home.  
14 Shortly after being advised by the aforesaid Dr.  
15 OKAWA that the aforesaid Colonel HASHIMOTO would  
16 obtain these bombs, some three hundred bombs were  
17 brought to my home where I hid them. Later on I was  
18 advised by the aforesaid Dr. OKAWA that the plan had  
19 failed for the reason that the military involved in  
20 the plot had backed out. Whereupon the aforesaid  
21 Dr. OKAWA and I visited the Office of the War Ministry  
22 for the purpose of ascertaining why the plan had  
23 failed from General UGAKI, Kazushige, the Minister  
24 of War, whom the aforesaid Dr. OKAWA revealed had  
25 participated in the plot. Upon calling at the office

SHIMIZU

DIRECT

1 of the aforesaid General UGAKI we were advised that  
2 he was not in and as we started to leave the building  
3 we encountered the Chief of the Military Affairs  
4 Bureau, General KOISO, Kuniaki, arriving in his  
5 car. The aforesaid Dr. OKAWA approached the afore-  
6 said General KOISO for the reason of the failure on  
7 the part of the Army officers to go through with the  
8 plan. General KOISO replied, 'It is a direct order  
9 from the Army that this plot be abandoned.'

10 "The plot was, therefore, suspended and  
11 later, on the request of Marquis TOKUGAWA, Yoshichika,  
12 I returned the bombs to Lt. Col. NEMOTO, Hiroshi, of  
13 the General Staff, an assistant of the aforesaid  
14 General KOISO.

15 "After the failure of the aforesaid March  
16 Incident I continued to see the aforesaid Dr. OKAWA  
17 from time to time at the Kinryutei Inn. On one of  
18 these occasions in August when the aforesaid Dr.  
19 OKAWA was drunk with saki he told me that he and a  
20 certain Colonel KOMOTO, Daisaku and a certain Colonel  
21 AMAKASU of the Kempetai, together with Colonel  
22 ITAGAKI, Vice Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army,  
23 would bring about an incident in Mukden sometime  
24 later on.

25 "After the occurrence of the Manchurian



1 Incident in September I was arrested and spent  
2 three months in jail. When I got out of jail in  
3 December 1932 I saw the aforesaid Dr. OKAWA several  
4 times. He was very busy at this period organizing  
5 Jimmu Kai, an ultra-nationalistic, rightist society,  
6 the aims of which were to bring about a renovation in  
7 the Japanese Government with the ultimate purpose of  
8 expelling the white race from Asia and the libera-  
9 tion of Asiatic people under the leadership of Japan.  
10 During one of our meetings sometime in March 1932  
11 the aforesaid Dr. OKAWA told me that he was interested  
12 in a plot with a certain TACHIBANA, Kozaburo, who was  
13 the leader of the farmers group and certain young  
14 naval officers who were dissatisfied with the weak  
15 Japanese Government at that time. I told the afore-  
16 said Dr. OKAWA that any such movement was contrary  
17 to public opinion and could not succeed and that  
18 I could not participate in any further attempts with  
19 him." Signed "SHIMIZU, Konosuke."

20 MR. HELM: You may have him.

21 MR. BROOKS: May I be heard, Mr. President?

22 THE PRESIDENT: You may cross-examine if  
23 you wish.

24 MR. BROOKS: I would first like to hear from  
25 the Tribunal the ruling as to the relevancy of the



SHIMIZU

CROSS

1 statement of this witness in regard to the Indictment.  
2 I believe that Section IV - 12b of the Charter pro-  
3 vides that to prevent unreasonable delay, the Court  
4 may rule out irrelevant issues and statements of wit-  
5 nesses. After hearing the statement read, the purpose  
6 of it is not clear in my mind as the plan failed;  
7 there is no connection or tie-up of this, that I can  
8 see, on this matter since he has turned the witness  
9 over for cross-examination.

10 THE PRESIDENT: The Court receives the  
11 affidavit for whatever probative value it has.

12 CROSS-EXAMINATION

13 BY MR. BROOKS:

14 Q Mr. SHIMIZU, in the fourth paragraph of your  
15 affidavit you state that Lt. Col NEMOTO was an assis-  
16 tant of General KOISO. Do you know that of your own  
17 knowledge?

18 A I returned the bombs on General KOISO's  
19 orders to Lt. Col. NEMOTO, who was head of the Press  
20 Section. Therefore, it is my understanding that  
21 Colonel NEMOTO was under General KOISO.

22 Q You say he was head of the Press Section  
23 and was therefore under General KOISO. Will you en-  
24 lighten us further in what control General KOISO had  
25 over this man whom you say was his assistant?

1           A    At the time I met and conferred with his  
2   Excellency KOISO concerning the return of the three  
3   hundred bombs which I had received from the Army.  
4   As a result of this conference I was ordered to return  
5   these bombs to Lt. Col. NEMOTO.

6           Q    Who gave you that order?

7           A    It was not an order. It seems that General  
8   KOISO talked -- asked -- it seems that General KOISO  
9   asked Marquis TOKUGAWA, Yoshichika, to ask me to  
10   return the three hundred bombs and, therefore, on the  
11   request of Marquis TOKUGAWA I returned the bombs to  
12   General KOISO.

13          Q    You just stated you returned the bombs to  
14   General KOISO. A few minutes ago you said you return-  
15   ed them to Lt. Col. NEMOTO. Which is correct?

16          A    No, I did not say that. I was asked by  
17   Marquis TOKUGAWA to return the bombs to General  
18   KOISO and, therefore, on meeting General KOISO, to  
19   whom I was supposed to return the bombs directly,  
20   he told me to return them to Lt. Col. NEMOTO.

21          Q    Now, KOISO was a General and NEMOTO was a  
22   Lieutenant Colonel. Is that the sense in which you  
23   meant that he was an assistant, because he happened  
24   to be of a lower rank?

25          A    No, I remember that at the time General

SHIMIZU

CROSS

1 KOISO was a Major General.

2 Q Will you answer the question as to the inter-  
3 pretation of assistant? If KOISO was a Major General  
4 at that time and NEMOTO was a Lieutenant Colonel, is  
5 that the meaning that you meant in your statement when  
6 you said he was an assistant?

7 A No, I do not mean assistant. Colonel NEMOTO  
8 was Section Chief of the Press Section and, even if  
9 he was not General KOISO's direct subordinate, as in  
10 the Japanese army a lower-ranking officer must obey  
11 his superior, Lt. Col. NEMOTO was ordered to receive  
12 the bombs from me.

13 Q You stated in paragraph three that this  
14 plan had failed and that the plot was abandoned and  
15 in the last paragraph you state that "any such move-  
16 ment was contrary to public opinion and could not  
17 succeed." Was there ever any renewal of this plot  
18 or plan of which you have any knowledge?

19 A In the March Incident in accordance with the  
20 unanimous opinion of the Army -- with the general  
21 opinion of the Army -- Dr. OKAWA was involved as a  
22 civilian.

23 LANGUAGE SECTION CHIEF: Addition: "March,  
24 1931 Incident."

25 A (Continuing) In accordance with orders

1 from Dr. OKAWA I also, in order to take a certain  
2 part in this plot, received three hundred bombs  
3 from the Army, but because the Army changed its mind,  
4 this plot was abandoned.

5 Q Now, will you answer my question? Was it  
6 ever renewed?

7 A The next year or the next year, I am not  
8 quite sure of the date, OKAWA told me that some young  
9 naval officers were plotting a certain kind of move-  
10 ment with the participation of a group of young  
11 farmers from IBARAGI, and I was asked by Dr. OKAWA  
12 to join in this movement. But, in view of the  
13 failure of the March plot of the year before, I  
14 felt quite dissatisfied and I felt that Japan could  
15 never be saved by the illegal movement of a few  
16 people. Therefore, I urged Dr. OKAWA to stop this  
17 movement and, therefore, he, Dr. OKAWA, told me that  
18 he would give up this plot, which was known as the  
19 May 15 Incident. Later, however, I found out that  
20 Dr. OKAWA had been connected with the May 15 Incident.

21 Q Now, will the witness answer yes or no?  
22 After all of this which I have not included in my  
23 question, will the witness answer yes or no? Was  
24 this plot ever renewed after these statements made  
25 in your affidavit -- was there ever any renewal of it?



1           A    No, it was plotted by Dr. OKAWA.

2           Q    Will the reporter read back that question  
3 to him -- was the plot ever renewed -- or have it  
4 interpreted to him? I don't think he got the correct  
5 interpretation; he surely must not.

6                   (Whereupon, the last question was  
7 read by the official court reporter.)

8           Q    After 1932, at the end of these statements  
9 here?

10          A    I do not remember definitely.

11          Q    Now, you seem to have a very definite  
12 memory down here in paragraph five. What connection  
13 did this plot or bombing have, if anything, with the  
14 present war in which hostilities have just ceased.  
15 Was there any connection with this and the present  
16 war, this plot?

17          A    With the present war?

18          Q    Yes.

19          A    There is no connection whatsoever.

20               MR. HELM: If your Honor please, we have  
21 offered this man as a witness to certain facts that  
22 happened, not to give his conclusions as to what  
23 bearing they might have had on the war.

24               MR. BROOKS: If your Honor please--

25               THE PRESIDENT: He should obviously be



1 competent to answer whether or not it had any  
2 association with the present war.

3 MR. BROOKS: He was part of it.

4 A As the March Incident of 1931 was out and  
5 out an internal -- a domestic problem, it had no  
6 connection whatsoever with the present war.

7 THE MONITOR: "East Asia War."

8 Q Now, in this paragraph five you have stated  
9 that Dr. OKAWA was drunk with saki when he told you  
10 a statement to the effect that there was to be an  
11 incident in Mukden sometime later on. Now, what  
12 date was this in August -- I mean what year was this --  
13 August of what year?

14 A I believe it was 1931.

15 Q Now, this incident in Mukden that he referred  
16 to, as you state -- how much discussion and exactly  
17 what was said about it at that time?

18 A I heard nothing definite on the Manchurian  
19 Incident but on a certain day when Dr. OKAWA was drunk,  
20 he told me that although the March plot had failed,  
21 an interesting happening would happen in Mukden  
22 sometime or other.

23 Q Then he did not say that he was planning or  
24 that he knew of a plan for such an incident? In other  
25 words, he did not make plain to you what he was

1 referring to? It might have been anything of a  
2 general nature, is that correct?

3 A He did not tell me definitely but my  
4 common sense told me that I could agree with him.

5 Q I would like to have a further explanation  
6 of your "common sense." I don't understand your  
7 answer. What do you mean, your "common sense?"

8 A I mean to say that even if he did not  
9 tell me anything definite, I could more or less  
10 guess what he was driving at; that is, if he gave  
11 me a certain hint, I would understand, "Ah, this  
12 is what he is driving at." That is what I consider  
13 common sense.

14 THE PRESIDENT: This is a convenient break.  
15 We will recess now until thirty minutes after one.  
16

17 (Whereupon, at 1200, a recess was  
18 taken.)  
19  
20  
21  
22  
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24  
25

## AFTERNOON SESSION

1  
2 The Tribunal met, pursuant to recess,  
3 at 1330.

4 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International  
5 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

6  
7 K O N O S U K E S H I M I Z U, called as a witness  
8 on behalf of the prosecution, resumed the stand  
9 and testified as follows:

## CROSS-EXAMINATION (Continued)

10  
11 BY MR. BROOKS:

12 Q Before adjournment we were discussing this  
13 occasion on which you stated Dr. OKAWA was drunk at  
14 the time he made a statement as set out in paragraph 5  
15 of the affidavit. I want to ask you if you had been  
16 drinking on that occasion and were drunk.

17 A No, I wasn't drunk.

18 Q Had you been drinking?

19 A No.

20 Q At the time that Dr. OKAWA made these  
21 alleged statements, or expressed his ideas, did you  
22 question his sanity because of this plan of alleged  
23 internal revolution?

24 A As he was drunk I wasn't conscious whether  
25 it was the truth or not.

1 INTERPRETER: Since he was drunk I didn't  
2 realize whether it was true or not.

3 Q Do I understand your answer to intimate  
4 that you did not give much weight to the statement?

5 A While on the one hand I didn't place much  
6 weight on his statement, on the other hand I gained  
7 the idea that something was afoot -- that something  
8 was being planned.

9 Q What was your occupation at that time?

10 A I was operating a bus line.

11 Q Who asked you to join in such a plot?

12 I What do you mean by such a plan?

13 Q I mean this plan that you have described as  
14 being one for internal revolution.

15 I It was from Dr. OKAWA that I heard of this.

16 Q What, specifically, did he say at the time  
17 he asked you to join?

18 A He said that young officers in the navy and  
19 members of a farmers group in Ibaraki, dissatisfied  
20 with the present political situation, had decided to  
21 start a certain movement in order to take over the  
22 government.

23 Q Did you discuss the conditions that brought  
24 about such a plan, what the reason was for such an  
25 action as was contemplated?



1           A    Since I did not want to repeat the failure of  
2   the March Incident, I urged Dr. OKAWA strongly to  
3   correct his way of thinking. Dr. OKAWA agreed with  
4   my opinion and said definitely that he would withdraw  
5   from the plot. Later I found out from newspapers for  
6   the first time that OKAWA had been connected with this  
7   incident.

8           Q    You found out later from the newspaper for  
9   the first time?

10          A    Yes.

11          Q    That is correct. You never reported any  
12   such plan to the authorities at that time, did you?

13          A    Since OKAWA was connected with the incident  
14   and I was connected with OKAWA, it was naturally  
15   considered that I was also connected with this inci-  
16   dent and I was detained in the Ichigaya Prison for  
17   thirty-three days, but the truth of the matter be-  
18   coming clear, I was immediately released.

19          Q    What had you been charged with at the time  
20   you were detained? What crime, if any, were you  
21   charged with?

22          A    On the basis of the suspicion that I had  
23   been acting in concert with Dr. OKAWA.

24          Q    You say that that was shown to be not true?

25          A    Yes. The fact that I had no connection with



1 Dr. OKAWA having become clear, I was released.

2 MR. BROOKS: Will the reporter read that  
3 last answer back? I didn't get it all.

4 (Whereupon, the last answer was  
5 read by the official court reporter.)

6 Q Now, these people that you have named that  
7 were associated with you and Dr. OKAWA, were members  
8 of the General Staff Department, isn't that true?

9 A No, they weren't limited solely to the Army  
10 General Staff.

11 Q Well, the General Staff Department, was it  
12 the one that was planning this internal revolution?

13 A I don't know whether it was the members of  
14 the Army General Staff that were plotting it. It was  
15 only through Dr. OKAWA that I knew that these people --  
16 that I heard that these people would unite with us and  
17 would act in concert with us.

18 Q Do you have any knowledge as to the cabinet,  
19 members of the cabinet and departments of the cabinet,  
20 trying to stop this plan by the General Staff?

21 A I do not know of such things.

22 Q Am I correct in saying that General KOISO'S,  
23 who was a member of the cabinet, one of the agencies  
24 of the cabinet at that time, only part in this affair  
25 was to order the plot to be abandoned and those bombs

SHIMIZU

CROSS

1 to be returned to NEMOTO of the General Staff?

2 A This matter of returning the three hundred  
3 bombs is something that happened much later, and  
4 through his Excellency KOISO the army made known its  
5 idea that the plot was to be abandoned as too early to  
6 Dr. OKAWA.

7 Q Did General KOISO state to you or make known  
8 to you such a statement as this being too early?

9 A I heard through OKAWA that it was the army's  
10 decision that it was too early for the plot. There-  
11 upon, OKAWA and I went down to General UGAKI, the  
12 then War Minister, in order to see him, but General  
13 UGAKI, although he was in, pretended he was out and  
14 wouldn't see us so that we had to leave. On our way  
15 home we met General KOISO.

16 Q What was said at that time by General KOISO?  
17 You said the army said this.

18 A OKAWA and I wished to find out from KOISO  
19 what caused the army to believe that the time was too  
20 early, so we asked General KOISO's opinion, but he  
21 said that he had to attend the Diet and he didn't  
22 answer our question. He also said that since this  
23 was an order from his superior officer he couldn't  
24 do anything about it.

25 Q I want to ask you, who brought these bombs to

1 your home?

2 A I didn't receive the bombs directly. One of  
3 my followers received the bombs on the platform of  
4 SHIMBASHI Station either from Colonel HASHIMOTO him-  
5 self or from Colonel HASHIMOTO's messenger. As I  
6 wasn't there myself, I don't know which one it was  
7 but at any rate he received them from one of them  
8 and I received them from him.

9 Q These followers of yours, were they bus  
10 drivers also?

11 A No.

12 Q You saw and examined these bombs yourself,  
13 didn't you?

14 A I didn't examine them.

15 Q You never saw them?

16 A They were wrapped in paper and kept at my  
17 house, so I never saw them, but I was told that they  
18 consisted of -- they were mock bombs that would make  
19 a loud noise and that would emit smoke.

20 Q In other words, they were nothing but fire-  
21 crackers, isn't that true? They were nothing but a  
22 dummy bomb, as you call it in the Japanese word.  
23 They were paper; they were not metal bombs and not  
24 of the dangerous type, as a handgrenade?

25 A Yes, that is what I was told.

SHIMIZU

CROSS

1           Q   Now, you realize that the statements that you  
2 have made about this plot were self-incriminatory, do  
3 you not? I want to ask you what induced you to give  
4 these answers, whether you were promised a gift, or  
5 whether you were threatened in any way if you refused  
6 to answer, by anyone. I am asking you about the  
7 answers in the affidavit, and the reason I ask you  
8 that is because as I came down the hall to this court-  
9 room this noon, you asked me, in touching my arm, if  
10 I would please handle you easy.

11           A   It was with no cowardly motive that I said  
12 that. I said that because I believe that these little  
13 incidents had nothing to do with the great problem  
14 that is being discussed here.

15           INTERPRETER: Instead of "great problem,"  
16 "great phases of this."  
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1 Q Now, on the second page of your affidavit  
2 the first line says: "After the occurrence of the  
3 Manchurian Incident in September I was arrested . . ."  
4 I want to ask you why, whether it was because you  
5 were believed to have taken some part in this al-  
6 leged Manchurian Incident?

7 A No. That is an entirely different incident.

8 Q Well, do you know whether any of the people  
9 named in your affidavit had any connection with what  
10 happened in Manchuria on or about the 18th of Sept-  
11 ember, 1931?

12 A I believe that Dr. OKAWA was one of them.

13 Q Then, you know that there was a plot or  
14 a plan that caused such an incident?

15 A No, I don't know of it definitely, but at a  
16 certain party when Dr. OKAWA was drunk he did tell  
17 me that although the March Incident had failed,  
18 an incident would develop in Manchuria soon.

19 THE MONITOR: Correction: Interesting inci-  
20 dent than the March Incident would occur in Manchuria.

21 Q What specifically did OKAWA say when he was  
22 drunk?

23 A As it was some over ten years ago, I do not  
24 remember definitely. But as I have just said, Dr.  
25 OKAWA said that an interesting incident would happen

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1 in Manchuria soon -- not said but hinted.

2 MR. WARREN: May we have that last answer,  
3 sir?

4 (Whereupon, the last answer was  
5 read by the official court reporter.)

6 Q What do you remember that he said at this  
7 time?

8 A I remember only to the extent of what I have  
9 just told you.

10 MR. BROOKS: That is all the questions I  
11 have, your Honor.

12 MR. HAYASHI: I am HAYASHI, Itsuro, counsel  
13 for the defendant HASHIMOTO, Kingoro. I wish to  
14 cross-examine the witness.

15 CROSS-EXAMINATION (Continued)

16 BY MR. HAYASHI:

17 Q You have said in your affidavit that you  
18 heard from Dr. OKAWA that Colonel HASHIMOTO, Kingoro,  
19 and others intended to reform the Japanese Government.  
20 But what do you mean by this reform of the Japanese  
21 Government?

22 A Internal political situation at that time  
23 was that of the confrontation of the Seiyukai and  
24 the Minseito Parties. Whenever the Minseito Party  
25 took the helm of the government, it carried out

SHIMIZU

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1 positive policy; while whenever the Minseito Party  
2 was in power it pursued a negative policy. Because  
3 of that, the welfare of the nation was not safe-  
4 guarded and the political parties were indulging  
5 in seeking their own interests, and because of that  
6 the nation in general was suffering very much.

7 THE MONITOR: Correction: Whenever the  
8 Seiyukai Party was in power it pursued a positive  
9 policy, and whenever the Minseito Party was in power  
10 it pursued a negative policy.

11 Q Then, do you mean by this renovation of  
12 the government that because the political parties  
13 had joined up with the Zaibatsu, or capitalists,  
14 and politics had become very corrupt, the political  
15 atmosphere should be renewed, and that persons of  
16 integrity should take charge of the government?

17 THE MONITOR: Was the aim that statesmen  
18 with good character should be brought up.

19 A The import of the March Incident was like  
20 that, and it purely aimed at internal reform.

21 Q Is the witness aware of the fact that be-  
22 tween April, 1929, and May, 1930, more than ten  
23 famous Japanese statesmen, including former Commerce  
24 and Industry Ministers TAWARA, Magoichi, and  
25 KOBASHI, Ichita, were arrested by the prosecutor's

1 office on the suspicion of having accepted bribes?

2 LANGUAGE SECTION CHIEF: That is September,  
3 1929, rather than April, 1929.

4 A Yes, I have read about it in the newspapers.

5 Q And in the investigation of these cases,  
6 was not also the charge made that the president of  
7 the Minseito, WAKATSUKI, Reijiro, received a bribe  
8 of a hundred thousand yen from the president of the  
9 Echigo Railroad, KUSUMI, Toma?

10 A I don't remember exactly.

11 Q Because of this, even though he had reduced  
12 the number of divisions by two, was not the intention  
13 of the plotters to have a man of the integrity and  
14 character of General UGAKI to take over the govern-  
15 ment--- Because of this, was it not the intention of  
16 the plotters to renovate the Japanese Government,  
17 with General UGAKI as its head, even though he had  
18 reduced the number of divisions by two?

19 A General UGAKI at that time was severely crit-  
20 icized by the younger officers of the army as the  
21 man who was responsible for curtailing the army.  
22 And if I remember correctly the public also shared  
23 that view.

24 Q Can you say definitely that the object of  
25 the March Incident was not to establish a government

SHIMIZU

CROSS

1 that would be aggressive and warlike?

2 A The March Incident was purely internal reno-  
3 vation plan, and it did not have aggressive character.

4 THE MONITOR: Correction: It is a fact  
5 that aggressive character was not included in the  
6 March Incident.

7 Q In the affidavit you state that you were ar-  
8 rested on September 1, after the outbreak of the  
9 Manchurian Incident. Now, do you mean by this that  
10 the Manchurian Incident broke out on September 1,  
11 or that you were arrested before the outbreak of the  
12 Manchurian Incident?

13 A It was just a coincidence. I was arrested,  
14 detained -- or, rather, I was summoned to the Metro-  
15 politan Police Board concerning a case in which a  
16 friend of mine was involved; and it had nothing to  
17 do with the Manchurian Incident.

18 THE MONITOR: On September 1.

19 Q Then, I shall ask you another question.  
20 Was not KITA, Ikki, famous for having helped Sun  
21 Yat Sen in his revolution in China?

22 A I heard a story to that effect from Pro-  
23 fessor KITA.

24 Q Therefore, can you not say that the move-  
25 ment of KITA, Ikki, and of Dr. OKAWA cannot be



1 considered ultra-nationalistic?

2 A By the word "extreme rightist movement," I  
3 meant to say, I meant the expression of fervent  
4 patriotism.

5 Q By this movement of KITA and of Dr. OKAWA,  
6 do you mean the Gyochisha and the Rosokai?

7 A It also included other organizations, such  
8 as the Jimmu-Kai.

9 Q Were you not a member, a fellow member, of  
10 the Gyochisha and the Rosokai and also an active unit  
11 of the Jimmu-Kai?

12 A I attended meetings of the Rosokai upon my  
13 return from Shanghai with Dr. KITA, but as I was  
14 young, I was not considered as a regular member of  
15 the party, member of either of the Jimmu-Kai or  
16 Rosokai.

17 THE MONITOR: Correction, please: As I was  
18 extremely young, I was not regarded as being qual-  
19 ified to be a member of Rosokai; I was not a member  
20 of Jimmu-Kai and Gyochisha.

21 Q Was not one of the principles of the platform  
22 of the Jimmu-Kai to drive out the white man from  
23 Asia?

24 THE MONITOR: Correction: Policy and  
25 principle.



SHIMIZU

CROSS

1           A    As I said before, I was not a member of  
2 Gyochisha or Jimmu-Kai, and, therefore, I did not  
3 know the rules or the platforms of those parties.  
4 Therefore, I do not know about that.

5           Q    However, in your affidavit you have said  
6 that the Jimmu-Kai was an ultra-nationalistic  
7 rightist society, the aims of which were to expel  
8 the white race from Asia. Is this statement a mis-  
9 take?

10          A    It was not the opinion of Dr. OKAWA to ex-  
11 pulse the white people from Asia.

12          Q    Then, I ask you again, did you sign this  
13 affidavit after you had seen the Japanese text, or  
14 did you sign it without seeing the Japanese text?

15          A    Although I didn't read it myself, a friend  
16 of mine who knows English well translated it for me,  
17 and I understood it by him.

18               THE MONITOR: Correction: Through my friend,  
19 who had a well command of English, it was translated  
20 for me and I read it.

21          Q    Then, may I understand that when you were  
22 interrogated by the prosecution, your friend was  
23 with you?

24          A    No, that is not correct.  
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1           Q   Then, do you mean to say what you said in  
2 your affidavit is different from what you are saying  
3 here and that what you are saying here is the  
4 correct version?

5           A   Since the outbreak of the Manchurian  
6 Incident, the general consensus of public opinion  
7 had been pointed to that direction.

8           Q   That is not an answer to my question. I  
9 shall stop my question here. The last sentence  
10 should be amended -- I shall take back my question.

11           Then, you have affirmed that you are not a  
12 member of the Jimmu Kai; but, in a document given  
13 to the defense from the prosecution, which has not  
14 yet been produced in evidence, that is document  
15 No. 1661 -- on page 6 of this document it is stated  
16 that you were a fighting unit of the action group  
17 of the Jimmu Kai.

18           THE MONITOR: Instead of "fighting unit,"  
19 "acting."

20           A   It must be a mistake because I was never a  
21 member of the Jimmu Kai.

22           MR. HELM: I ask the counsel to introduce  
23 this document in evidence, your Honor.

24           THE PRESIDENT: It can be used this way.  
25 He should be asked whether he had ever made a

SHIMIZU

CROSS

1 statement inconsistent with his present testimony:

2 That document could be handed to him.

3 MR. JUSTICE MANSFIELD: If the Tribunal  
4 pleases, this is not a statement by the witness.  
5 It is rather an exhibit of the prosecution from  
6 which he is now cross-examining this witness.

7 THE PRESIDENT: It is not the witness'  
8 statement?

9 MR. JUSTICE MANSFIELD: No.

10 THE PRESIDENT: Then it cannot be used.

11 Q Then I shall ask you another question:

12 In March of 1932 did you hear of a certain  
13 TACHIBANA, Kozaburo from Dr. OKAWA?

14 A Although I don't remember the date, I heard  
15 from Dr. OKAWA of that name.

16 Q In another document which has not yet  
17 been produced in evidence, document number --

18 MR. HELM: I object, your Honor.

19 THE PRESIDENT: Is that a statement by  
20 the witness?

21 MR. HELM: No, sir. He read from another  
22 one of the prosecution's documents which has not  
23 been introduced in evidence yet.

24 THE PRESIDENT: That is not a statement by  
25 the witness?

SHIMIZU

CROSS

1 MR. HELM: This is not a statement by our  
2 witness at all.

3 THE PRESIDENT: Then he cannot use it.

4 MR. HELM: I would be very glad, your  
5 Honor, to have these counsel introduce these in  
6 evidence. The prosecution certainly does not object  
7 to the introduction of these documents in evidence  
8 at this time. We intend to introduce them later  
9 on ourselves.

10 MR. BROOKS: If the Tribunal please, I  
11 would like to hear the translation of what he said.  
12 They objected before it was even translated. I  
13 don't know what he said. I don't know what the  
14 objection was.

15 (Whereupon, the question above  
16 referred to was interpreted from Japanese  
17 into English as follows:)

18 "Q According to page 41 of another document  
19 which has not yet been introduced in evidence,  
20 namely, No. 1908, Dr. OKAWA said that on May 15,  
21 1932 the witness had not heard of the name TACHIBANA,  
22 Kozaburo."

23 Q Then, was it before May 15, 1932 or after  
24 May 15, 1932 that you heard of the name TACHIBANA,  
25 Kozaburo from Dr. OKAWA?



SHIMIZU

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1           A    I don't remember the date exactly.

2           MR. HAYASHI: That is all I have to say.

3           MR. SHIOHARA: I am counsel for the defend-  
4 ant KIMURA -- SHIOHARA, Teksaburo. .  
5 few simple questions.

6           CROSS-EXAMINATION (Continued)

7 BY MR. SHIOHARA:

8           Q    In what year was the witness born?

9           A    I was born in 1895, January.

10          Q    What school did you attend?

11          THE PRESIDENT: Well, this is hardly  
12 helpful.

13          Q    You say you went to Shanghai in this  
14 affidavit. When did you go there, what year?

15          A    I went there when I was nineteen years old.

16          Q    Would you tell us of your personal history  
17 from that time until about 1931?

18          THE PRESIDENT: Now, that is unnecessary.  
19 It is too remote from the times in issue here.

20          You may make any suggestion you wish against  
21 his character.

22          MR. SHIOHARA: In order to ascertain his  
23 relationship with KITA, and so forth, as set forth  
24 in this affidavit, I felt this question was necessary.

25          THE PRESIDENT: Put your next question.



1 Q I wish to know your personal history from  
2 the time you went to Shanghai when you were nineteen  
3 years old up to 1931.

4 THE PRESIDENT: Question disallowed.

5 Q In your affidavit you say that "I was  
6 arrested on September 1, after the outbreak of the  
7 Manchurian Incident." Is this correct?

8 A Yes, it is correct.

9 Q What do you mean by "On September 1, after  
10 the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident"?

11 THE PRESIDENT: That is a futile question  
12 as far as I am concerned. He should not be asked  
13 to explain the meaning of that. That question is  
14 disallowed.

15 Q You say in your affidavit that in August  
16 you met Dr. OKAWA at the Kinryutei, and that he  
17 talked to you about things -- being drunk. But,  
18 do you believe that he was in his senses when he  
19 told you this?

20 A I hope you will use your common sense to  
21 understand that sort of question.

22 Q Do you mean to say that one cannot credit  
23 what Dr. OKAWA said on such an occasion?

24 A Dr. OKAWA sometimes gets very drunk after  
25 having absorbed small portions of liquor, and some

SHIMIZU

CROSS

1 other times he doesn't get drunk at all even after  
2 having drunk very much; and this is a point which  
3 we cannot determine.

4 THE PRESIDENT: We will recess now for  
5 fifteen minutes.

6 (Whereupon, at 1445, a recess was  
7 taken until 1500, after which the proceed-  
8 ings were resumed as follows, Japanese to  
9 English and English to Japanese interpreta-  
10 tion being made by OKA, Takashi and  
11 MASUTANI, Hideo, Sho Onodera acting as  
12 Monitor:)

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1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The Tribunal is now  
2 resumed.

3 MR. BROOKS: Mr. President and Members of  
4 the Tribunal; I would like to request that I be  
5 permitted to withdraw the appearance I made in be-  
6 half of OKAWA for cross-examination, and only be  
7 considered on behalf of KOISO. The reason I make  
8 this request is that the Japanese attorney, Mr.  
9 OHARA, who is the chief counsel of Mr. OKAWA, is not  
10 permitted to ask questions in OKAWA's behalf, and my  
11 appearance in behalf of both defendants in this  
12 case prevents, he believes, from his statements  
13 made to me -- I believe that there is a conflict,  
14 because one of them happened to be in the employ-  
15 ment of the War Department -- in the Cabinet -- and  
16 the other happened to be on the General Staff --  
17 departments which were two separate departments  
18 of equal rank at that time.

19 I request that I be allowed to withdraw  
20 so that Mr. OHARA may ask a few questions of the  
21 witness in Mr. OKAWA's behalf.

22 THE PRESIDENT: We will permit that course  
23 to be taken.

24 DR. KIYOSE: Mr. President, I would like  
25 to give some information concerning a point which

SHIMIZU

CROSS

1 I have noticed amongst what Mr. SHIOHARA said. I  
2 should like to point out a mistake in translation.  
3 In the English text of the affidavit -- it is in  
4 the last paragraph of the affidavit -- in the second  
5 line of the last paragraph, it says: "-- in  
6 September I was arrested and spent three months in  
7 jail," and this "I" was mistaken as "1" in the  
8 Japanese text and is translated as such.

9 THE PRESIDENT: That is a colossal trifle.  
10 The necessary correction will be made.

11 MR. OHARA: I would like to put a few  
12 questions to the witness as the counsel represent-  
13 ing OKAWA.

14 CROSS-EXAMINATION (Continued)

15 BY MR. OHARA:

16 Q In the last part of your affidavit you  
17 have stated that the Jimmu-Kai was an ultra-national-  
18 istic rightist society, the aims of which were to  
19 bring about a renovation in the Japanese government,  
20 with the ultimate purpose of expelling the white race  
21 from Asia and the liberation of Asiatic peoples un-  
22 der the leadership of Japan. This statement in your  
23 affidavit is inconsistent with the testimony you  
24 have given here. Are you willing to omit this part  
25



SHIMIZU

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1 from your affidavit?

2 A Since Lord Lytton's Commission came to  
3 investigate the true aspect of the Manchurian af-  
4 fair, we were systematically told by the government  
5 propaganda that Japan would not permit the inter-  
6 ference of western powers into Manchurian Affairs.

7 THE MONITOR: Correction: Not since Lord  
8 Lytton made a report, but after the Manchurian  
9 Incident there was talk that Lytton would investi-  
10 gate the problems of Manchuria and, in fact, come  
11 there to investigate the problems, and the Japanese  
12 government through its propaganda agencies dissemi-  
13 nated to us that the Japanese government would not  
14 tolerate any interference by America.

15 Q I shall reframe my question. Did you not  
16 state that OKAWA had no intention of driving the  
17 white man out of Asia?

18 A Yes, I did.

19 Q Then, in the last part of your affidavit,  
20 you have stated that the aims of the Jimmu-Kai were  
21 to expel the white race from Asia. Are you willing  
22 to delete this part from your affidavit?

23 A I was never directed by Dr. OKAWA to follow  
24 the principle of expelling the white people from  
25 Asia.



SHIMIZU

CROSS

1 Q Then, at least as far as this part is con-  
2 cerned, your affidavit is mistaken, is it not?

3 A However, the general consensus of opinion --

4 Q I am not asking you about the general trend  
5 of social society. I shall ask another question.

6 Towards the end of the first page you have  
7 talked about Dr. OKAWA having said something when  
8 he was drunk, and you also stated that you were  
9 able to infer your conclusions through your common  
10 sense; but, in other words, does that not mean that  
11 you simply imagined those things?

12 A It was imagination on my part, of course.

13 CROSS EXAMINATION (Continued)

14 BY CAPTAIN KLEIMAN:

15 Q Mr. SHIMIZU, did Ikki KITA, to whom you  
16 refer in your affidavit, advocate the following:  
17 The overthrow of parliamentary government, the con-  
18 fiscation of all private property above five hun-  
19 dred thousand yen?

20 A Is that a question concerning Mr. KITA?

21 Q Yes, it is, Mr. Witness.

22 A I cannot understand Mr. KITA's philosophy.

23 Q When were you last in Shanghai, Mr. Wit-  
24 ness?

25 A When I was nineteen.

SHIMIZU

CROSS

1 Q What year was that?

2 A I believe it was in the Taisho Era, that is  
3 to say, between 1912 and 1926. The Taisho Era covered  
4 this period.

5 Q When you were in Shanghai were you ever  
6 paid by any foreign agency which advocated the over-  
7 throw of the Chinese government?

8 A No.

9 Q How much were you earning as a bus driver?

10 THE PRESIDENT: We do not want his earnings  
11 as a bus driver.

12 CAPTAIN KLEIMAN: All right, sir, I will  
13 withdraw that question.

14 Q Where did you secure the two thousand yen  
15 that you state you contributed, in this affidavit?

16 A From my own private funds.

17 Q Did you ever advocate the overthrow of  
18 the Japanese government, and the confiscation of  
19 private property above five hundred thousand yen?

20 A No, I have never done such a thing.

21 MR. LOGAN: There is no further cross-  
22 examination of this witness. May we have the per-  
23 mission of the Tribunal to recall this witness on  
24 the prosecution's case after the prosecution has  
25 introduced document 1661?



SHIMIZU

REDIRECT

1 THE PRESIDENT: I do not know what that  
2 document is.

3 MR. LOGAN: That is a document concerning  
4 which the Japanese counsel wish to ask a question.

5 THE PRESIDENT: We will consider that  
6 motion.

7 Mr. Helm.

8 MR. HELM: Mr. President, on redirect  
9 I would like to clear up just one point.

10 REDIRECT EXAMINATION

11 BY MR. HELM:

12 Q Mr. SHIMIZU, did you or did you not ever  
13 hear Dr. OKAWA say anything about the Manchurian  
14 Incident before it happened?

15 MR. McCORMACK: If the Court please, we  
16 object to the witness answering this question be-  
17 cause it is leading and suggestive. He has given a  
18 direct answer before.

19 THE PRESIDENT: You may answer the question.

20 A I have heard of such a thing before the  
21 Incident occurred.

22 MR. HELM: That is all, your Honor.

23 (Whereupon, the witness was excused.)

24 May I have 11514?

25 I would like to call at this time Marquis

1 TOKUGAWA, Yoshichika.

2 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: Mr. President,  
3 the witness, TOKUGAWA, is now in court and will  
4 be sworn.

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1 TOKUGAWA, YOSHICHIKA, called as a  
2 witness on behalf of the prosecution, being  
3 first duly sworn, testified as follows:

## DIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. HELM:

Q What is your name?

A TOKUGAWA, Yoshichika.

Q Have you made an affidavit for use in this  
9 case?

A Yes, I did.

Q Is this it?

A Yes.

Q Was this affidavit read to you in Japanese?

A No, it was not.

Q Is this your signature?

A Yes, it is, without mistake.

Q Do you read English?

A Yes, I can.

Q Did you read it in English?

A Yes, I read it in English.

Q Are those facts true?

A Yes, they are.

23 MR. HELM: I offer this document in evidence  
24 and ask it be appropriately marked as prosecution's  
25 next-in-order.



TOKUGAWA

DIRECT

1 CLERK OF THE COURT: Number 158.

2 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted.

3 (Whereupon, prosecution's exhibit No.  
4 158 was received in evidence.)

5 MR. HELM: (Reading)

6 "I, TOKUGAWA, Yoshichika, do swear on my conscience  
7 that the following is true:

8 "I have known Dr. OKAWA, Shumei for a long time.  
9 I have had many long discussions with him about his  
10 advocacy of the Showa Restoration, his ideas publicly  
11 expressed in his many books on Pan Asianism and the  
12 relief of Asiatic peoples from white oppression.

13 "Some time in January or February 1931 I was present  
14 at an inn in Tokyo with the aforesaid Dr. OKAWA, Shumei,  
15 and some others. Before dinner there was some general  
16 discussion about a plan to place the militarists in  
17 control of the government.

18 "Some time about the middle of March 1931 a certain  
19 Army Colonel by the name of KOMOTO, Daisaku came to my  
20 house at night and presented the name card of the Chief  
21 of the Military Affairs Bureau, General KOISO. Kuniaki.  
22 The aforesaid Colonel KOMOTO then said that the afore-  
23 said General KOISO had instructed him to call on me  
24 and ask me to see the aforesaid Dr. OKAWA, Shumei and  
25 persuade him to abandon the execution of the plan they

TOKUGAWA

DIRECT

1 had previously agreed on, to-wit: to install a  
2 government by military coup de etat. The aforesaid  
3 Colonel KOMOTO departed and I immediately proceeded  
4 to the house of the aforesaid Dr. OKAWA, Shumei, where,  
5 after lengthy discussion, the aforesaid Dr. OKAWA,  
6 Shumei agreed to abandon the plot in accordance with  
7 the desire of the military.

8 "Several months later the aforesaid General  
9 KOISO, Kuniaki called me on the telephone and asked  
10 me to come over to his house. I did so and while  
11 there the aforesaid General KOISO told me that he was  
12 in a bad situation at the General Staff; that he had  
13 procured some three hundred bombs for use in the abort-  
14 ive March coup de etat; that these bombs had been de-  
15 livered to the house of a certain SHIMIZU, Konosuke  
16 and were still in the aforesaid SHIMIZU's possession.  
17 The aforesaid General KOISO said further that he had  
18 made several demands on the aforesaid SHIMIZU to return  
19 the bombs, but that the aforesaid SHIMIZU refused to  
20 deliver up the aforesaid bombs. The aforesaid General  
21 KOISO then told me to see the aforesaid SHIMIZU at once  
22 and persuade him to return the aforesaid bombs and to  
23 pay the aforesaid SHIMIZU money if necessary. I  
24 immediately went to the house of the aforesaid SHIMIZU  
25 and persuaded him to return the aforesaid bombs to the

TOKUGAWA

CROSS

1 "military without payment of money." Signed  
2 "TOKUGAWA, Yoshichika."

3 You may ask.

4 (Whereupon, SHIMADA, Masakazu replaced  
5 MASUTANI, Hideo as interpreter.)

6 MR. SAMMONJI: I am SAMMONJI, Shohei, counsel  
7 for the defendant KOISO. I would like to ask a few  
8 questions.

9 CROSS-EXAMINATION

10 BY MR. SAMMONJI:

11 Q Mr. Witness, you have just said that you  
12 have not read the Japanese text of this affidavit, is  
13 that correct?

14 A I can't hear you very well. Please repeat it.

15 Q You have said that you did not read the  
16 Japanese text of the affidavit, is that true?

17 A Yes, it is. Yes, it is true. I didn't hear  
18 it in Japanese.

19 Q Then you cannot tell whether the translation  
20 that we Japanese lawyers have received of this affi-  
21 davit is correct or incorrect?

22 A I cannot tell whether it is correct or in-  
23 correct because I didn't hear it in Japanese.

24 MR. SAMMONJI: Mr. President, as we have no  
25 means of ascertaining whether the translation we



TOKUGAWA

CROSS

1 Japanese lawyers have received is correct or incor-  
2 rect, we do not know how to conduct a correct cross-  
3 examination.

4 THE PRESIDENT: Assume that it is correct.

5 MR. SAN'ONJI: Then I will put questions  
6 according to this affidavit.

7 Q In the middle of the affidavit we find the  
8 following words: "The aforesaid Colonel KOMOTO then  
9 said that the aforesaid General KOISO had instructed  
10 him to call on me and ask me to see the aforesaid Dr.  
11 OKAWA, Shumei and persuade him to abandon the execu-  
12 tion of the plan," et cetera, -- "to abandon the  
13 execution of the plan they had previously agreed on."  
14 What do you mean by this "they?"

15 A Are you asking me who I mean by the word  
16 "they" here? I couldn't hear you very well now.  
17 Did you say "they" and are you asking me whom I mean  
18 by the word "they?" By "they" I mean Dr. OKAWA and  
19 others.

20 Q I understand. A little bit further you  
21 state: "I immediately proceeded to the house of the  
22 aforesaid Dr. OKAWA, Shumei, where, after lengthy  
23 discussion, the aforesaid Dr. OKAWA, Shumei agreed  
24 to abandon the plot in accordance with the desire of  
25 the military."



TOKUGAWA

CROSS

1           You have used the phrase "the desire of the mili-  
2       tary." Whom do you mean by this "military?"

3           A   By this "military" I meant I was asked by  
4       General KOISO to persuade Dr. OKAWA to abandon this  
5       plot. This is what I meant by "the desire of the  
6       military."

7           Q   There is one other place which I find very  
8       difficult to understand. That is in the fourth par-  
9       agraph. You say that General KOISO said that "he was  
10      in a bad situation at the General Staff." What does  
11      that mean? According to this paragraph, according to  
12      these words it would seem that General KOISO was a  
13      member of the General Staff whereas in the preceding  
14      paragraph you have said General KOISO was Chief of the  
15      Military Affairs Bureau. Which do you mean?

16          A   At that time General KOISO was the Chief of  
17      Military Affairs Bureau.

18          Q   Then do you mean by this phrase that the  
19      General Staff was in a bad situation?

20          A   That was what I understood from what General  
21      KOISO said to me at that time; but, however, I don't  
22      know the fact of the matter.

23          Q   At that time what was the position of General  
24      KOISO? In other words, in more understandable words,  
25      speaking frankly, was General KOISO a conspirator, a

TOKUGAWA

CROSS

1 member of that plot, or was he in a position to stop  
2 that plot?

3 A I don't know about that problem very well  
4 because I received for the first time the name card  
5 from his Excellency KOISO when I was told by him to  
6 stop the plan, the plot entertained by Dr. OKAWA.

7 Q One more question. When General KOISO called  
8 on you and asked you to have the bombs returned, did  
9 he not say that these plans reflect upon the honor  
10 of the Army and that, therefore, some method of  
11 stopping them must be found?

12 A The most important point among what he said --  
13 what General KOISO said to me at that time was, as far  
14 as I can remember, how to get those three hundred  
15 bombs back to the Army.

16 Q One more question. At that time did you  
17 not hear from him what kind of bombs these bombs were?

18 A When I met General KOISO first, I did not know  
19 what the nature of those bombs was but later on I  
20 learned that those were not real bombs but were mock  
21 bombs, that is, bombs that would emit a loud sound but  
22 would have no effect on people.

23 CROSS-EXAMINATION (Continued)

24 BY MR. OHARA:

25 Q I am OHARA. In the first part of your

TOKUGAWA

CROSS

1 affidavit you state: "I have known Dr. OKAWA, Shumei  
2 for a long time. I have had many long discussions with  
3 him about his advocacy of the Showa Restoration, his  
4 ideas publicly expressed in his many books on Pan  
5 Asianism and the relief of Asiatic peoples from white  
6 oppression." I wish to question you on this point.  
7 From the Japanese text it would seem that you talked  
8 with him about his books on Pan Asianism and the re-  
9 lief of Asiatic peoples from white oppression. Also  
10 it seems that you talked with him about his advocacy  
11 of the Showa Restoration, but is that correct?

12 THE MONITOR: Correction: "which is it --  
13 which did you talk about?"

14 A As Mr. OKAWA is an old friend of mine, I  
15 have discussed with him on both subjects but prior  
16 to the March Incident I remember having discussed with  
17 him about Showa Restoration.

18 THE MONITOR: "Mostly."

19 Q What do you think the Showa Restoration means?

20 A According to my interpretation, two political  
21 parties were fighting each other at that time in Japan  
22 and the people were suffering because of that. There-  
23 fore, we endeavoured to find a method to establish a  
24 new and serene Japan. That is my understanding of  
25 the issue.



TOKUGAWA

CROSS

1 THE MONITOR: Correction or addition: "That  
2 was the main point of discussion."

3 Q Then the main point of your discussion was  
4 the brightening of politics, the brightening up of  
5 politics?

6 A Yes, just as you say.

7 Q I would like to ask about something else.  
8 In the next part of your affidavit you say: "Some  
9 time in January or February 1931 I was present at an  
10 inn in Tokyo with the aforesaid Dr. OKAWA, Shumei,  
11 and some others. Before dinner there was some gen-  
12 eral discussion about a plan to place the militarists  
13 in control of the government." In this you have used  
14 the words "a plan to place the militarists in control  
15 of the government." Is this the language you used  
16 in your affidavit?

17 A I didn't use the word "militarists."

18 Q That is the word that is used in the Japanese  
19 text. What do you mean by this?

20 You have said "a plan to place the militarists  
21 in control of the government." Was there such a plan?

22 A I didn't mean to say "to place the militarists  
23 in control of the government." I meant to say, what I  
24 meant to say was "by the force of the Army -- of the  
25 fighting services."



TOKUGAWA

CROSS

1 Q You mean then in order to brighten up  
2 politics this was your plan?

3 A According to Mr. OKAWA's opinion, the only  
4 way to carry out this plan was, after having destroyed  
5 the political structure which existed at that time.

6 THE MONITOR: Addition; "and in order to  
7 do this the power of the armed forces was necessary."

8 Q Then, in conclusion, you mean that was nec-  
9 essary in order to have a bright government?

10 A As you say. I should like you to understand  
11 it to mean that in order to eliminate the darkness  
12 which hung over the politics of Japan at that time,  
13 it was necessary to use the power of the military.

14 THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now until  
15 thirty minutes past nine tomorrow morning.

16 (Whereupon, at 1600, an adjournment  
17 was taken until Thursday, 27 June, 1946,  
18 at 0930.)  
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